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M&co, Mexico, D.F. 04510, Mkxico 
Some of the best-known textbooks on the history of mathematics share what I 
call a “standard interpretation” of the origin and development of the set-theoretic 
paradoxes [Eves 1976, 473-483; Kline 1972, 1183-1210; among others]. One 
might describe the basic premises of this standard interpretation in the following 
way. Most scholars claim that Cesare Burali-Forti discovered the contradiction of 
the greatest ordinal number in 1897 [Bell 1945,279; Bourbaki 1969,49; Bunn 1980, 
237; Clark 1975, 79-80; Copi 1958, 281; Hobson 1905, 170; Kattsoff 1948, 88; 
Kennedy 1963, 262; Kline 1972, 1003; Poincare 1905, 822-823; among others]. 
Immediately after its publication, dozens of papers appeared dealing with the 
paradox [van Heijenoort 1967, 1041 and, as a consequence, more paradoxes were 
encountered. It has been said that Georg Cantor came upon similar paradoxes 
connected with the greatest cardinal and ordinal numbers in 1899 [van Heijenoort 
1967,113; Dou 1970,651. However, recent studies assert that this discovery came, 
perhaps, as early as 1895 or 1896 and, therefore, that Cantor anticipated Burali- 
Forti in his discovery [Bell 1945, 55; Bochenski 1970, 388; Copilowish 1948, 64, 
note 2; Dauben 1979, 192; Dauben 1980, 212; Grattan-Guinness 1971, 365; Zlot 
1957, 1001. According to the standard interpretation, Bertrand Russell presented 
another paradox in The Principles ofMathematics [ 19031, although he had discov- 
ered it in 1901, and described it in a letter to Gottlob Frege a year later [Russell 
1944, 13; Russell 1956, 26; Russell 1959, 75-76; Grattan-Guinness 1978, 1351. 
Three main points should certainly be stressed in connection with this “stan- 
dard” interpretation. First, it claims that paradoxes were originally encountered 
as the result of criticism of the theory of transfinite numbers [Kennedy 1970,593]. 
Second, that discovery of the paradoxes made clear the need for a reexamination 
of the foundations of mathematics and, as a direct result, the paradoxes stimulated 
three major philosophical schools in mathematics [Struik, 1967, 1611. Finally, 
following the dichotomy proposed by Frank Ramsey [1926, 352-3541, historians 
may generally assume that the semantic paradoxes were a direct product of the 
logical ones. 
The grounds for this standard interpretation all seem very reasonable, and even 
make sense chronologically. Although there have been certain conflicts and dis- 
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agreements, historians and researchers working in this area of study have not 
suggested solutions to the historiographical problems generated by the discrepan- 
cies [Garciadiego 1983, l-341. 
It was not until 1978, more than 80 years after its publication, that the fact that 
there was no paradox in any of Burali-Forti’s papers of 1897, or in Cantor’s letters 
to Richard Dedekind of 1899, was pointed out [Moore 1978, 308-3091. Neverthe- 
less, a substantial number of authors were discussing the Burali-Forti paradox at 
the turn of the century. Consequently, the question arises: if Burali-Forti did not 
discover the paradox of the greatest ordinal number, then who did? There is no 
simple answer to this question [Moore & Garciadiego 1981, 331-3421. In fact, the 
so-called Burali-Forti paradox was the result of a slow process of metamorphosis 
in which several mathematicians and philosophers transformed the understanding 
of others. The first elements required for its formulation emerged in Russell’s The 
Principles of Mathematics. Nevertheless, at the time, Russell thought he had 
resolved the difficulty. The argument familiar today took its present shape through 
the work of people like Philip Jourdain, Henri Poincare, Louis Couturat, and 
others. 
A detailed analysis of the origin of Burali-Forti’s paradox has revealed its close 
relationship with the paradoxes of Cantor and Russell. In fact, it has recently been 
shown that Russell came upon all these paradoxes in May and June of 1901 
[Garciadiego 1983, 148-1841. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that Russell 
discovered the paradoxes as a consequence of his attempt to reconcile some of 
Cantor’s results with Russell’s belief in the real existence of the class (set) of all 
classes (sets), which Russell thought was contradictory. That is to say, Russell 
came upon the paradoxes once he had accepted Cantor’s transfinite numbers, not 
as an outcome of his criticisms. 
Now that a new interpretation of the origin of the paradoxes has been presented 
(including the semantical ones [Garciadiego 1985]), it is of fundamental impor- 
tance to consider its implications. The traditional account of the effects of the 
discovery of the paradoxes should be scrutinized in all its details. For example, 
one must question the role of the paradoxes in the origin and development, among 
other issues, of the modern schools of thought in mathematics. Unfortunately, the 
standard interpretation has been used, even explicitly, to discourage mathemati- 
cians from becoming concerned with the analysis and study of the fundamental 
notions and concepts of mathematics [Sacks 1975,523l. Nevertheless, the histori- 
cal interpretation suggested here claims an equally logical and even more consis- 
tent alternative. This new interpretation presents a more interesting and fertile 
tool for the future analysis and history of the principles of mathematics. It will 
help convince scholars, including historians and mathematicians, to take another 
look at this important episode in modem foundations. 
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